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ABSTRACT
Energy Analysis of Flat Water Recreation :
An Economic Assessment
by
Craig Leon Howell , Master of Science
Utah State University , 1984
Major Professo r:
Department :

Dr . E . Bruce Godfrey
Economics

Energy analysts believe that traditional economics and
energy markets undervalue the only absolutely limited
resource , ene r gy .

They have produced methods to supplement

or supercede economics .
However, theoretical underpinnings of these methods
include an energy theory of value which is shown to be too
narrow to sup p ort workable economic models or numeraires .
Sample rankings of recreational values on four Utah
reservoirs, using energy analysis and economic methods , show
that the two methods yield opposite rankings.
(72 pages)

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Economics concerns itself with the efficient allocation
of resources .

It is generally recognized that traditional

economics may not adequately deal with some problems of
allocation .

Some of those problems include non - market

goods , externalities , imperfect or restricted markets and
intergenerational resource allocations (Bator, 1958 , and
Scitovsky , 1954) .

Other disciplines have recognized these

problems and offered alternative solutions but these may be
no better than traditional economic solutions.

One of the

alternatives that has been suggested is energy acc o unting or
energetics.
In the 1950s, Dr . Howard Odum, a systems ecologist at
the University of Florida , formulated calculations
suggest~ng

that a research project using algae as an energy

producer was a net energy consumer because the project was
kept in operation only through the use of fossil fuels
purchased with research funds .

Odum concluded that energy

tallies could give a more accurate reading of a project ' s
feasibility than economics .

He subsequently constructed

engineering schematics for the energy flows in the economy
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and environment.

Other researchers soon joined Odum and

energy accounting was developed . (Clerk 1974).
Energy accounting broadens the traditional engineering
input-outpu~

energy efficiency ratios to include the energy

inputs and outputs of the system under consideration.

As

represen t ed in Figure 1 which is a simplified sc hematic
d~~5ram

of energy origin, use and disposal, the accounting

procedures either ascertain how much energy is available to
final consumers (net energy -- Y-F in Figure 1.)

or how much

in s i tu energy is needed to deliver a given energy to the
consumer (gross energy-- G-F in Figure 1.)
F
Feedback to Keep
Energy Flowin g (F)
Energy Proces sing ------~
y--~
System

Gross Energy (G)

l

Energy
Sink
Figure 1 .

Main
Ec ono my

1

Energy ~----~--~
Yield (Y)
Energy
Sink

Schematic representation of energy flows
with net and gross energy shown

(Source Odum , 1977)
Within the last f ew years as public awareness of the
possibility of energy shortages grew, significant interest
has been manifested in energetics as a supplement to
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traditiona l economic analysis.

Energy accountants maintain

that energy accounting delivers crucial inf o rma tion on
energy scarcities not provided by traditional economic
methods .

Economics with the engineering , medical ,

sociologica l and environmental fields seeks to define the
costs and efficiencies of resource decisions.

The necessary

data and models satisfactory to all are not easy to obtain
nor are the correct . policy implications easy to draw .

Thus,

energetics is a significant advancement if more accurate
information or modeling results from it .

Evaluation of

energetic theo ry and methods is therefore important.

An

economically efficient use of resources will not occur when
a market does not exist .

One of the areas where markets

often do not exist involves the provision of outdoor
recreation.

As a result, this area

provide~

an example that

can be used to evaluate the failure of a market solution and
what energetic methods/methodology can add to the existing
situation.
Objectives of Study
In order to obtain a clearer idea of the theoretical
and practical utility of energetics , I propose to :
1)

Evaluate energy analysis and methods from an

ec onomic point of view;
2)

Estimate recreati on values on the same reservoirs
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using energetic and economic methods ; and
3)

Compare and eval ua te the results obtained in

procedures 1 and 2 .
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CHAPTER II
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF ENERGY ANALYSIS
Resource Scarcity
The U. S . conservation movement accepted the classical
economist's, Ricardo (1966) noti on of absolute resource lim its but rejected laissez faire as an efficient means of
allocating natural resources .

Men such as Pinchot and Muir

argued that government intervention with an eye toward the
welfare of present and future g ener ations could improve on
the unfettered process of natur a l res o urce markets (P inc hot
191 0).
The movement was successful in fostering conservation
legislation during the early 1900s (e . g. , the Parks Act of
1907 and the CCC of the Roosevelt era) .

Concurrently,

another group , the technocrats (possessi n g ,a healthy disre spect f or markets ) , developed under the leadership of Howard
Scott .

This group wanted to replace the monetary system

with energy units.

The y argued that economic theory was

incapable of handling technological change and fluctuations
in res ource availabi lity .
Naturalist philosophy, the scarcity doctrine and the
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technocratic ideology, suffered setbacks up until the late
1960s and early 1970s because many professionals associated
with natural resources were influenced by spectacular tech nological achievement and embraced the notion that tech nology would ameliorate scarcity and environmental difficulties (Smit h 1974, and Burt and Cummings 1970).

However ,

with the advent of the 1973 oil embargo and other supply
shocks, natural reso~rce managers began once again to pay
pa rti cular attention to exhaustible res ource stocks .
In fact, many now suggest that world resources cannot
support continued economic growth for several reasons (Ford
Foundation 1974) .

First ,

stitutable for each other .

resources are not completely sub Eighty-two of the ninety - two

natural elements together comprise less than 1% of the
earth's crust (Brobst, et al 1973) .

Many critical indus -

t rial elements comprise minute fractions.

As a result,

shortages of some critical elements may develop (e . g .,
chromium) .

Mea dows , et a l

(1972) were perhaps the first

technologist to use systems analysis techniques to forecast
the demise of civilization through re source depletion and
pollution .
Second, an increasing number of scientists suspect that
the traditional hypothesis that large quantities of lower
grade but minable ores are available is false.

The tradi -

tional hypothesis is based on a unimodal ore grade
distribution in which larger amounts of lower grade ores are
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available as smaller quantities of high grade ores are
depleted.

This situation is depicted in Figure 2 .

The new

hypothesis (see Figure 3) is based on a bimodal ore grade
distribution in which only the high qua lit y ores under the
right most cu rve in Figure 3 are minable .

The more abundant

lower grade ores under the left most curve n Figure 3 wouldn't
be economically minable .

If the new hypothesis is correct ,

minable ores would be exhausted much sooner than has been
traditionally supposed .

I

Limit of Minable Ores

Amount of
Element

r

Current Mi ning

Ore Grade
Figure 2 . Traditional hypothesis of ore
distribution
Limit of Minable Or es
Amount of i
Element
1

Ore Grade
Figu re 3 .

New hypothesis of ore distribution

(Sou rce Skinner 1976)
Third, resource managers have recognized that given
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fores eeable technology and energy constraints , the earth ' s
nonrenewable resourceo will be exha usted in finite time if
extraction rates are positive and nondeclining .
Resource Misallocation
Energy accountants assert that economics does not allo cat e finite resources and pa r ticularly the limiting one
(ener gy ) correctly (Cook 1 975 , Berry and Fels 1973 , Clark
1974 , Odum 1973 , Slesser 1974 and Hannon 1975) .

The comm on

assumption among these authors ' arguments is th at even com petitiv e markets are often not energy eff i cient.

Many tasks

could be done at lower energy costs and energy inefficient
markets should be curtailed .
For exa mple , Hannon (1975 , p . 96) of the Energy
Research Group at Urbana , after noting that the relative
cost of electricity decreased from 1925 - 1975 , said :
The point is two fold . The cost of electricity has
failed to repr esent its importance in the market plac e
and the situation has grown worse with time.
Barry Sedlik ( 1979 , p . 30) stated that economists do not
deal adequately with depletable resources .
If the price goes up economists say you inc r ease sup ply . But , increasing the energy supply is not desir a ble because you a re dealing with a nonren ewab le com modity .
Others contend that economic mark et models work well only
when r es ources are infinite , Bell (1977), or wh en market
plann i ng horizons are infinite , Berry (1972).
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Empirical evidence is offered.

The studies of Berry

and Fels (1973), Hannon (1975) and Pimentel, et al (1975)
show that significant energy savings could be realized in
the production of goods ranging from cars to crops .

The

concept shared by these researchers is that economics
ignores energy constraints and therefore results in an
inefficient allocation of energy resources .
In summary, the energetic view is that economics is
penny -w ise and energy - foolish -- the ultimate long - run
foolishness .

Thus , some energetic researchers suggest that

an energy theory of value be used to allocate energy
resources.
The Energy Theory of Value
The energy theory of value holds that energy is the
sole limiting production factor .

Life exists on a slope

between concentrated energy (low entropy) and dispersed
energy (high entropy) .

The second law of thermodynamics

states that irrevocable percentages of energy becomes
unavailable for man's use as energy is processed by living
organisms or degraded through natural processes .

Therefore,

finite energy resources are an absolute constraint.

On the

other hand, mate r ials are not physically destroyed , but only
changed .

Given enough energy , they can be recycled .

It is

easily argued that we have the same amount of materials now
as in the dawn of history .

Berry (1972), Gilliland (1975)

and !lan non (1975) conclude that energy is the most important
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resource because it is the only . truly exhaustible one.

All

others can be recycled or synthesized, given enough energy .
Thus, the value of a good is simply the amount of energy
used to produce it .

Hannon (1975) asserts that only through

adoption of an energy unit of value and appropriate restructuring of the economic and legal system can correct alloca tion of resources be obtained.
Many energy accountants do not think that adopting an
energy unit of value and Hannon ' s othe r measures are necessary .

Thus, at least three major groups have emerged who

accept an energy theory of value in differing degrees .
Odum ' s group, including Gilliland and Hannon, take the
strongest pro - energy theory of value position .
In his major work on energetics , Environment Power and
Society, Odum (197 1 ) suggests that:
1)

All progress is due to special power subsidies; and

2)

Power is the common denominator to all process and

materials .
In a later work (1976, p . 30), H. Odum and E. Odum
clearly state that energy is the mainspring of value .

" It

is not human beings and their money that determine what is
important.

It is the world's energy ."

sole determinant of efficiency .

Thus, energy is the

"The greater the net energy

obtained by a process, the more efficient the process " (Odum
1973, p. 220) .
Others elaborate Odum's hypothesis .

Hannon (1975)

suggests that energy intensive nations should raise the
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relative price of energy to induce more labor intensive
technologies, thereby increasing energy productivity.
(1972 , p . 10) said ;

Berry

" It is desirable to minimize the con -

sumption of thermodynamic potential in achieving any goal ."
This is the thermodynamic analog of the

st~tement :

" It is

undesirable to throw away money needlessly."
The second group of energy accountants say they reject
the energy theory o'f value but seem to tacitly accept it .
Slesser (1977), for example , states that outside the Odum
school, no one to his knowledge accepts the theory .

He then

says that energy accounting is superior to economics in
forec asing ene r gy requirements and thus in normative fore casting.

From Slesser's statements it is clear that he does

not think the market energy values are high enough .
Economic markets may under value energy for several reasons .
First, markets may ·not account for related non - market goods
like pollution .

Second , the true value of energy may not be

reflected by regulated or otherwise imperfect markets.
Third, markets might not allocate energy across generations
correctly.

Fourth , markets which are influenced by sub -

jective human demand may not price energy at its true value .
Slesser does not mention the first two reasons .

When he

criticizes economic forecasts of energy requirements, he
alludes to the intergenerational allocation o f resources .
In addition , his faith in the normative superiority of ener getics and therefore an energy numeraire shows that he
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thinks that the energy markets do not assign energy its true
v alue .

Therefo r e , Slesser appear s c l ose to accepting an

energy theory of value .
The least sanguin e group , including Bell (1977) and
Bullard (1975) , clearly r eject the ene rgy theory o f value.
They argue that energetics can play o nl y a secondary role in
project evaluation .

Bell , for example , agrees that energy

accounting is useful only when comparing similar projects
fo r ene r gy efficiency .

Bu llar d (1975) states that energy

accounting may be useful in much the same way as environmental impact statements are .

It should be noted that this

group views energy as a critical but poorly acknowledged
constraint because t h ere would be no need t o emphasize
ene r gy if markets accurately reflected energy scarcity .
Thus , this g r oup impli citly assumes some type of market
failure.
Definition of Names
Among energy analysts, there is gen eral ag r eement that
the second law of thermodynamics proves that finite energy
sources are an abs olute constraint .

None have attacked t he

notion that ene rgy is the only absolute constraint be cau se
materials can be rec ycled .

Howeve r, disagreement ex is ts o n

two concepts :
1)

An ene r gy theory of value ; and

2)

The use of energy analyses as a normative policy
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tool .
Only Od um' s g roup ex pl ici tly ac cep t s the ener gy theory of
value and its corolla ry that all values can be imputed to
ener gy .

Both Odum ' s group and some energy analysts like

Hannon a nd Slesser argue that energy analysis is a norma ti ve
policy tool .

The l ast gro up , including Bell and Bullard ,

r e je ct both con cept s .

Instead , they expand traditional

engineering energy efficiency ba sed on the Carnot e ngine
cycle to include energy eff icien c i es of non - p owe r produ cing
goods and se r v ices .
superiority.

This g roup s uppo ses no n o rm a tive

However , energy " effic i ency " (abbreviated to

efficiency in the literature) is at least an implicit goal .
Hereafter , to facilitate discussi on , those who ex plicitly or
impli cit ly acce pt an ene rgy theory of value , in cl uding Odu m,
Slesser , Hannon and the like will be referred to as energetists a nd their work e nergetics b eca use of th ei r norm ative
appr oach .

The second g roup , including Bell and Bullard , who

sim pl y expan d th e ran ge of energy efficiency a naly s is, will
be cal led ene rgy accountants and their work en e rgy account ing .

Energy analysts and energy a nalysis will be used to

deno te both g roup s and the ir work .

Later sections that d i s -

cuss empirical meth ods will require the distin c ti o n between
the gross energy accounting and net e nergy accounting
schools .

Net energy accountants are energetists .

Some

g r oss e nergy accou nt ants , e . g ., Slesse r and Hannon , a r e
ene r geLists , while others , includ in g Bell and Bulla r d , are
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energy accountants .
En e rgetists who see

en~rgy

analysis as a major r eplace -

ment or supplement to traditional economics follow a logic
and come to conclusions that can be summa r ized roughly in
the following manner .
finite .

Fi r st, non - living earth resources are

However , since energy can be used to recycle or

process low grade mineral s , energy is the ultimate limiting
constrai nt .

In order , then , to insure future welfare , we

mu st conse rve energy as much as possible .

Prese nt mark et

forces do not reco gnize the critical nature of the energy
co n straint .

Extra market forces must move the economy

toward a steady state .

To achieve this , the present deci -

sio n matrix must be changed to reflect the importance of
energy .
Energetics , using the more stable and accurate energy
num eraire , reflects energy pre - eminence and should supple ment or replace economics .
Two energetic conclusions are clear :
1)

Th at energy accounting can improve intergenera -

tion al r esource allocations ; and ,
2)

That an e nergy numeraire is superior to dollar

units .
Improving Intcrgenerational Allocation
Through Energy Accounting
Energy analysts assert that markets under value energy
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and fail to consider finite fossil fuel stock s .

As a

r es ult, the present generation squanders fuel s and res o ur c es
that should be left for future ones .

Ecologi s ts wh o espouse

this position maintain that economies compete according to
Latka ' s principle ( 1922) .

This principle stat e s that the

system which survives is that which maximizes the useful
power from all sources .

This means that ener gy - inefficient

but fast growing biosystems are adapted when n e w energy
sources open but slower growing , more energy efficient
biosystems are adopted once virgin energy sources are tapped
and competition for avail a ble energy increases .

Energetists

agree that few new energy supplies are available and that
economic growth is non - adjustive .

A steady economic state

with zero growth that husbands energy resource s is the sys tem that will survive , given present constraints .

Odum

(1973) suggests that unless such a steady stat e is
approached now , ecological and cultural disast e rs are
unavoidable and that energetics can correct th e market
myopia and help smooth transition to the steady state .
Energetists theorize that in a steady state , the ener getic interest rate will be zero .

A zero interest rate

insures that present and future wealth is valu e d equally
because it is impossible to save a current dollar to gain
more than one dollar in the future .

Positive interest

rates, on the other hand , cause future incomes to be dis counted, i . e . , to borrow one dollar today one must give up
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more than one dollar in the future .

As a result, these

groups suggest society should not have a positive interest
ra te for two reas ons .

First, energy is measured in units

that do not change ove r time .

Hence , the inflation portion

of the interest rate is zero .

Second, in a steady state , no

material gains are possible in the future through current
savings and therefore a dollar saved today cannot yield more
than one dollar in the future (Clark 1974) .
Energy Units as Numerai re
Energetic advocates agree that an energy unit, be it
BTU, KWH, etc ., is or should be stable .

Two years or 1000

years from now, a unit of ene rgy will still be a unit of
energy .

This does away with the problems of inflation and

price movements due to changes in demand.
A classical example of the fallacy of market values is
that of oil shale.

It was projected that when oil reached

$3 . 73/bbl, or $6 . 80/bbl , or $15 . 00/bbl, or $21 . 00/bbl, or
$25 . 00/bbl , (Bell 19 77 , p . 5) , extraction from oil shale
would become feasible .

Energetists argue that the energy

content of a BTU will never change .
a more telling and stable numeraire .

As a result, energy is
In the words of

Malcolm Slesser (1977, p . 259),
Free market shale oil would never be economical until
oil from crude has a gross energy requirement per bar rel close that of oil shale
See also Gilliland (1975) .

Furthermore, because energy is
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the on ly absolutely limiting factor, long term costing is
best done in energy units (Berry 1972 and Slesser 1977) .
According to this view, energy analysis , because future
energy costs are more stable than future prices, is a better
indicator signalling future problems than discounted dollar
costs .

This advantage is derived from the fact that work

values of energy are affected by technology alone which
changes slowly .

"T~chnology

will not help in five years;

will be of little help in 15; but can do anything in 50"
according to Teller (1976).

On the other hand , dollar

values are more volatile being subject to changes in demand ,
supply, technology and inflation .
Furthermore, energy analysts point out the difficulties
economics has with non - market goods such as pollution and
destruction of scenic areas.

First , it is pointed out that

benefit/cost ratios do not measure all the effects of man's
action on his environment .

Second , clearly the economic

measures can change drastically depending on such things as
the discount rate used and the relative evaluation of
aesthetic and recreat ional opportun ities.

Finally , using

dollars to compare environmental and social benefits and
costs is literally an exercise in comparing wild ducks and
super highways .

Energetists express all values in terms of

the amount of energy used in goods p r oduced or lost when the
eco - system is altered .

At least three proponents state that

energetics is the true measure of environmental impact (Odum
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1971, Berry 1972 and Cook 1975).

Cook, for example, thinks

that the primary benefit of energetics is to arrive at
evaluations of externalities not based on aesthetics but on
energy value to society.

Slesser (1975, p. 171), espouses

the strongest form of this dogma:

"To measure the cost of

things in money" which is, after all, nothing more than a
highly sophisticated value judgment, "does not offer a firm
basis for evaluation."

Berry adds (1972, p. 9):

Actually, if economists were to look at scarcity in a
more complete way, their estimates would come closer
and closer to the estimate of thermodynamicists.
In summary, energy analysts maintain that economics
overlooks absolute energy constraints and as a result,
misallocates resources.

To correct these problems, ener-

getists suggest employing an energy theory of value and the
resulting energy numeraire to correct resource misallocations.

Energy accountants urge greater use of energy effi-

ciency ratios in project evaluation.

Procedures which

energy analysts have developed to facilitate their suggestions will be explored in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER III
EMPIRICAL METHODS USED BY ENERGY ANALYSTS
Energy analysts disagree on some issues and as a result
have developed several

~mpirical

methodologies.

When Odum and others developed energetics , several
questions arose .

For example :

Should the sunlight and

labor be included in energy calculations ; should the emphasis be on maximizing the energy available to consumers or
minimizing the insitu energy used to produce final energy ;
what energy units are to be used ; what conve rsi on between
energy sources is correct; how are material resources such
as metal to be valued in energy terms ; how is energy measured?
These questions caused divisions among the supporters
of energy analysis .

The situation is so undecided ener -

getist P. F . Chapman (1974a, p . 91) said :

"There are as

many methods as there are workers in the field ."
there appears to be two main schools .

However,

Odum and his follow -

ers assume that energy is the only limiting factor in an
economy.

They therefore include sunlight and labor in their

acc ounts because both represent energy input .

Odum's group

usually employ net energy analysis which seeks to find the
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net energy available to the consumer .
Others including Slesser (1976) and Bullard (1975) the orize that energy i s important and is under represented in
economics but for project analysis , the energy contained in
sunlight and labor is disregarded b ecause both are present
wh e ther or not a project is built .

This group is generally

referred the g r oss energy accountants .

Th ey adhere to the

methodology of the International Federation of Institutes
for Advanced Study in Sweden (IFIAS 1974) .

IFIAS views

energy account in g as the determination of the ene r gy
sequeste r ed in the process of making a good or service .
On a practical level , both maj or schools represent a
duality ; maximizing available energy to c o n sumers is the
same as minimizing e n ergy insitu used per unit of final
energy consumed .

As a result , both methods have complimen -

tary strengths and weaknesses.

Net energy analysis focuses

on energy delivered to consumers a nd does not evaluate the
efficiency of the processes .

Gross e n ergy focuses on effi -

ciency of providing e n ergy a nd says nothing of total energy
delivered to consumers .
A list of f our energy analysis objectives is provided
by Chapman (1974a , p . 94) :
1)

To analyze particular processes in detail to deduce

an energy e ff ic i e nc y and hence make recommendation s f or con s e rving energy ;
2)

To analyze the consu mpti o n of energy on a large
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scale either to forecast energy demand or to point to
policies which could reduce future demand ;
3)

To analyze the energy consumption of basic techno -

logies such as food production and mine r al extraction to
show some of the future consequences of technological trends
or an energy shortage ; and
4)

To construct energy costs and examine energy flows

so as to understand the thermodynamics of an industrial sys tem.

This type of long - range aim may be coupled to projects

such as " world modeling " based on physical rather than mone tary flows .
These general objectives are listed h i e r archially so
that a study under objective one could be part of a larger
one under 2 , 3 or 4 .
objectives .

Energetic studies include all four

Energy accounting studies include objective one

and possibly two .
Regardless of ideology, researchers use four basic
methods to carry out studies .

First , ene r gy analysts esti -

mate costs of many energy intensive goods through basic
research .

Ex a mp l es of this method inc l ude Bell ' s ( 1 977)

estimation of BTU/CY of concrete and earth work and the
Colorado Ene r gy Resea r ch Institutes '
fossil fuel appl i cations .

(1976) study of nine

The major p r oblem with this

method is that i t is time consuming and requi r es expertise
in the targeted processes .
Second , investigators with little time or expertise
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find costs of many industrial items by referring to
statistical tables supplying energy consumed per unit of
output.

Results are often order of magnitude estimates

because the energy used to process primary energy sources
and capital depreciation are not included in the estimates .
Process analysis is a third method used by energy
analysts .

Analysts first identify all processes contribut -

ing to the final product .

(See Figure 4 . )

Each individual

process is then studied to identify its inputs .

Finally,

each input is assigned an energy requirement and the total
project energy is obtained through addition .
analysis suffers from three main drawbacks.

Process
First , arbi-

trary decisions about the system boundaries must be made
such as the limits of boundaries 1, 2 and 3 in Figure 4.
Second, energy values for some inputs are difficult to esti mate.

Finally , the economy is often so complex that every

important secondary or tertiary input is not found .

There -

fore, process analysis is often truncated at the primary
inputs .
The fourth method uses the national input-output (I/O)
tables to estimate energy requirements .

An entry in the

Table Xij represents the dollar amount of good "i", needed
to produce a dollar of output "j".

(See Figure 5.)
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For a given set o f outp u t s, say vec to r

P, the input

requirements, vector B, can be found by mul ti plying mat rixes
X and P; that is:

XP

=

B

All goods (v ector Z) needed to produce B can be found by the
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same method:
Z = BX = X(X ( ?) ) -

x2 p

Hence, all direct and indirect inputs used produce output P
are :
2

3

n

+ X P + X P . . . +X P
This series can be summed (Chiang 1974) and is equal to :
P(I - X) - 1
The r esu l t is that all the energy inputs for any given
output can be obtai ned by multiplying the matrix ( I - X) -

1

by

an appropriate energy conversion (vecto r E) to obtain energy
r equirements e:
e = E(I - A) - 1

The ener gy research group located a t

the University of

Illin ois at Urbana (1980) developed energy r equirements for
all 357 goods l ist ed in each of the 1963, 1967 and 1971
United States I/O tables .

Chapman (1974b)

developed less

complete data for the United Kingdom .
There are some disadvantages to this approach as well .
Clearly, the I/0 tables are highly aggregated.

Another dis -

advantage is that the I /0 data is in doll a rs, not physical,
units .

This can lead to errors if goods hav e large t r ans -

por tati on costs or pr ic e fluctuations .

Furthermore , energy

data deriv e d f r om dollar deno minated I/0 tables are no more
accurate than the data f r om which they are derived.
Howeve r, I /O t ables have great ly speeded energetic
analysis.

Before tables we re availab l e , wo r kers had to

25
analyze the process by which each good was made to assign
energy costs .

The tables make it possible to truncate the

process whenever little information is available on the
input s or they appear to be relati vely energy unintensive .
Many examples of ene r gy analysis are available from the
Unive rsity of Illinois Energy Research Group ( 1974) .

We now

turn to the evaluation of the theo r etical constraints of
ene r gy analysis models .
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CHAPTER IV
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
Much economic research has studied res ource scarcity ,
mi sallocations , theories of value and intergenerational
allocations and numeraires.
unresolved .

Several problems remain

Each issue will be examined and the potential

contribution of energy accounting will be discussed .
Resource Scarcit y
It must be noted at the outset that there is debate as
to whether resources are truly finite in historical time.
Peterson and Fisher (1977 , p . 692) state that :
Mine rals are like the juice in an orange . The total
amount extracted depends on how hard the orange is
squeezed and there is a lways a little left behind . .
this relates to the definition of reserves, the known
amounts of a mineral that can profitably be recovered
at cur rent prices .
Mineral discoveries, technical change or price increases can
therefore increase reserves (Brobst , et al 1973) .

Barnett

and Morse (1963) wrote the seminal work on this subject.
They pointed out that in the period of 1 870 - 1957,
tecnological progress and new resource discoveries
outweighed the higher costs of lower quality and
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inaccessible resources in agriculture and mining.

Their

thesis was simply that the inseparable role technology plays
i n modern economic growth can circumvent both Ricardian and
Malthusian scarcities .
Mo r e recently , Nordhous (1974) showed that relative
prices of eleven minerals have fallen vis - a - vis labor since
1900 .

Substitution of labor and capital for natural

resources and cheaper more abundant raw materials for more
expensive materials are documented by Rosenberg (1973) and
Humphrey and Moroney (1975) .
Others have echoed this theme , i . e . , resource stocks
can only be defined in terms of technology .

The most

extreme view was expressed by McAvory (1979 , p . 1) :

" Ulti -

mately, there is no such thing as a nonrenewable resource . "
Cautions and dissenting opinions have been offered .

Vernon

Smith (1976) states that the rate of decline in mineral
prices has tended to diminish in absolute magnitude over
time.

Mineral reserve studies also ignore environmental

costs of mineral extraction (Fisher and Peterson 1976).
Georgescu - Roegen (1971) warns against extrapolating
Barnett and Morse's data because it covers an abnormal
period in which resource discoveries outstripped the ability
to use them .

Because low entropy (energy) is the " taproot

of economic scarcity , " any pricing system market or ener getic will ultimately fail once the theoretical limits of
usable material and energy are reached.
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Even if critical shor t ages of materials or energy
will lead to civilization ' s demise , the issue is whether
energetics provides a better estimate of finite resources.
Economi sts recognize that reserve estim ates need
improvement .

Peters on and Fisher (1977) and Herfindahl and

Kneese (1974) , for example , suggest closer collaboration
with geologists on reserve estimations .

Although ener -

getists including Gilliland (1975) , Berry (1972) and Odum
(1973) agree that energetics provides better reserve esti mates, they have yet to advance their own reserve estimates .
In addition , a major conceptual problem awaits their
efforts .

Energetists define reserves in energy unit s while

markets, if not society , define reserves as that which is
r ecoverable , given current prices and technology .

Prices

reflect human tastes and . preferences (demand) and the human
effort needed to procure goods and services (supply) .
Energy units do not reflect human desires or toil and as
such cannot serve as a guide to the maximization of human
welfare .

Georgescu - Roegen ( 19 79) shows a priori that ene r gy

analysts cannot provide better estimates of resource
reserves that are economically exp l oitab l e .

His analysis is

reviewed on page 38 .
Resource Misallocation
Energetists argue that economics is not efficient in an
energy sense and thus misallocates resources .

Few
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economists equate energy efficiency with overall economic
efficiency.

Economic efficiency is a measure of the

preservation of all resources with respect to the lowest
dollar cost pe r unit of output .

Thus , economic efficiency

implies energy efficiency but not vice versa .

For example,

market forces dictate that a firm uses each resource " effi ciently" relative to the othe r scarce resources employed in
a process .
Let a firm make good (G) with labor ( L) costing PL and
energy (E) , costing PE.

The cost of producing a good (PG)

can be found using the equation :
PG = (PE)(E)+ (PL)(L)
If a unit of energy costs $1 . 00 and a unit of labor
$5 . 00 , relative efficiency dictates that six units of energy
will not be used for a job that one unit of labor could do
because energy to accomplish the job would cost $6 . 00 while
labor could accomplish it for $5 . 00 .

Similarly, using 1/4

unit of labor to do what one unit of energy could do would
be economically inefficient .

In fact , market competition

forces the firm to use resources in a ratio that equates
marginal output per unit of resource cost for all resources .
To employ resources in any other manner would mean that the
output could be produced more cheaply by employing more of
the factors that have a greater marginal product per dollar
and less o f those with smaller marginal product per dollar.
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Marginal Product of Labor
Price of Labor

Marginal Product of Energy
Price of Energy

Therefore , economic efficiency implies efficient use of all
resources in the sense that all resources are used to supply
hu man desires, given relative resource prices and industrial
techniques at the lowest overall cost.
Efficiency as espoused by adherents of the energy the ory of value dictates that output per unit of energy
expended be maximized.

This definition of efficiency

ignores the other constraints (in the example , Price of
Labor) and is therefore economically inefficient .

The the -

oretical basis for energetic efficiency is that energy is
the only absolute constraint and therefore maximizing output
per energy expended is efficient from man ' s point of view.
Economists do not ignore material constraints .

How-

ever , economists agree that markets may waste resources or
be "ineffi cient ," depending on one's normative assumptions,
and may misallocate resources in cases of monopoly , non-mar ket goods, government regulations , externalities, commonly
held resources and the like (Bator 1958, Scitovsky 1954).
In r esponse to these shortcomings, economists have developed
several models to assess and correct market failures in non renewable resource allocations.
relevant models follows.

Highlighting of the

Gray (1914) formulated the first

comprehensive theo r y of exhaustible resources.

Despite the

model ' s static nature, Gray was able to project price time
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paths and the effects of taxes on the dynamic mining industry.

In his seminal work , Hotelling (1931) developed the

first dynamic model, i . e . , one that would optimize present
and future extraction of a nonrenewable r esource.

More

recently , Gordon (1967) and Cummings (1969) used dynamic
modeling to determine optimal resource extraction rates .
These authors concluded that mineral reserves are capital
assets that receive a normal rate of return, i . e . , are efficiently utilized in an economic scene in the absence of mar ket imperfections.

Hotelling (1931), Stiglitz (1976) ,

Sweeney (1977) an·d Weinstein and Zeckhauser (1974) have used
models to predict monopo l y extraction rates without con census as to whether it produces an extraction rate greater ,
lesser o r equal to a free market.
Koopmans (1974) modeled extraction rates as interest
rates

in~rease

and concluded they would increase.

Others,

e . g ., Krutilla (1975), suggest that if exploration or other
large investments are needed to increase extraction,
extraction will decrease when interest rat es rise .
Hotelling ( 1931), He r findahl and Kneese (1974) ag r ee that
exploration for reser ves is decreased when exploration g ives
neighboring property owners free mineral deposit information.

Schulze (1974) and Weinstein and Zechhause r

(1974)

show that , wit h some caveats , a free mar ket re sults in the
optima l amount of recycling .

Ayres and Kneese ( 1 969) ,

Fisher and Peterson (1976), a mong others , explore the
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interaction between environment and resource extraction .
Dasgupta, et al (1976) model ext raction rates in the face of
uncertain future demands and technology .
Such models suggest methods to correct misallocations
and raise additional questions .

More importantly, they show

that markets allocate nonrenewable resources as well as
other resources .

Energetics has not developed competing or

complimenta ry models .

The energy theory of value will be

examined to ascertain if it can support such models.
The Energy Theory of Value
One or more of .the following crite ria must be

m~t

if

energetics is to replace or supplement economics :
1)

Energy is the true limiting factor and as such is

more important than traditional economics holds ;
2)

Energy is the only ultimate source of value;

3)

The tools of energetics, e . g . , energy numeraire and

energy evaluations of environment , are superi or to their
economic counterparts; and
4)

An energetic model reflects the world better than

economic models .
Energy as an Absolute Constraint
Energetists claim that material dissipation can be com pletely reversed, given enough energy .
the single absolute constraint .

Therefore, energy is

Several physics concepts
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contradict this logic .

First , the Heisenberg uncertainty

principle ( 1927) showed that at the subatomic level , it is
impossible to simultaneously observe the position and veloc ity of an object .

The determi n at i on of the position depends

on the abil i ty to observe it .

But , observing such small

particles , even with something as delicate as light waves ,
changes the velocity of the particle .

Thus , there is a the -

oretical lower limit to the size of particles which ca n be
observed and gathered .

Georgescu - Roegen (1979) arrives at

the same co n cl u sion using different means .
There is a strict material e n ergy dichotomy .

Energy

cannot be u sed to purif y materials i ndefi n itely because
Planck (1932) showed that no gas , liquid or solid can be
freed from the last traces of foreign contaminating sub stances .

Exceptions can occur only at absolute zero .

But

Nernst ' s third law of thermodynamics showed that absolute
zero cannot be obtained .

Georgescu - Roegen (1971) offers

other (though more cont r oversial) reasons .

First , processes

are perfectly reversible only i f p erfectly reversible
machines exist ; but , perfectly revers i ble machines must be
frictionles s .

F rictionless machines exist only if the pro -

cess is infi n itely slow .
d eri ved from t h em .

Thus , no use f ul work can be

Second , in order to derive benef it from

en e rgy , mate ria l receptacles must be used .

As the

rec e ptacles wea r out , an infinite regress of materia ls is
n e e rled to process the energy .

Finally , th ese physical
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concepts demonstrate that materials and energy are limiting
factors .

If this is true, preoccupation with the energy

theory of value is counterproductive.
Energy as the Sole Source of Value
To economists, the most serious problem with the energetic approach is that some energetists attempt to, in
Hannon's words (1975, p. 101), "maximize productivity per
energy unit" expended rather than social welfare .

Economist

Georgescu - Roegen (1979) flat ly states that there is no
direct connection between energy flows and the enjoyment of
life.

Utility is a flow derived from energy, materials and

psychic intangibles .

The energy theory of value leads to

spurious economics because it fails to address the multiple
source and objectives of human welfare.
The Energetic Model and Reality
The assumption that energy analysis yields information
in addition to that provided by economics is held by all
energy analysts.

For example, the Colorado Research Group

(1976) rejects the energy theory of value and then suggests
that an energy criterion be used to evaluate projects alike
in every respect except energy efficiency.

This suggestion

clearly implies th at economics does not reflect differen ces
in energy efficiency.

However, the energy theory of value

considers only one of a host of factors influencing economic
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activity.

Thus , the theory is unlikely to supply a satis -

factory economic model.
It is instructive to review other theories of value.
In the 17th century, commerce was often strapped for means
of exchange.

A group of political economists of the time,

the merchantilists , assumed that the source of wealth was
precious metal and championed laws to foster bullion
accumulation .

Misselden, for example (1662 , p. 19) , urged

that England " restrict trade within Christendom in order to
preserve treasure."

Two centuries later, Marx noted the

travails of the laborer and expounded the labor theory of
value .

Marx (1906 , p . 46) said:

We see then that which determines that magnitude of the
value of any article is the amount of labor socially
necessary or the labor time socially necessary for its '
production .
Marx (1906, p . 114) also does not think market prices
reflect the true value of a good .
Magnitude of value expresses the connection that neces sarily exists between a certain article and the portion
of the total labor time of society requ i red to produce
it .
As soon as a magnitude of value is converted into
price , the above necessa r y relation takes the shape of
a more or less accidental exchange ratio between a
single commodity and another ; the money commodity .
One of the latest champions of the unde r valued
production factor is Naisbitt (1984) who thought the value
of the revolution in information technology was
underestimated .

" We need to create a knowledge theo r y of

value to replace Marx ' s obsolete labor theory of value ."
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Thus, merchantilists, Marxists, energetists and
Naisbett have maintained that a single production factor is
a key source of value and that market prices do not reflect
this.

A brief comparison of Marx's theory and the energy

theory of value follows.

Both Marxists and energetists

maintain that a single production factor is the source of
value and that market prices often do not reflect correct
values.
The labor theory of value is criticized because it cannot explain value derived from scarcity or great utility
such as the Mona Lisa.

Energetics, similarly, cannot

explain why the price of most goods and services does not
correspond to their energy contents.

Both Marxists and

Odum's group are vague on qualitative differences in labor
and energy respectively.

Slesser (1974) , for example,

thinks it unfortunate that energy forms are not priced the
same per BTU.
differences.

He does not offer an explanation of these
Marxists and energetists maintain that inter -

est rates would be zero if the correct numeraire were used
and exploitation of the source of value stopped.
If either the labor or energy theory of value were used
to price resources, serious allocative and equity problems
would arise.

For example, if interest rate, i.e., the price

of capital, were zero and other production factors were
priced according to the energy embodied in them, owners of
resources would be paid only for the fractions of
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technology , land, labor, etc ., that are the resu lt of ene rgy
e xpen ditures .

As a result, owners of non - energy factors

would be paid less than the "full value " of their productive
factors and would supply less of them, ceteris paribus .

A

serious equity problem would result because rents that nor mally would accrue to owners of non - energy resources would
accrue to those owning energy resources.

However , it should

be noted that at least some ene rgetists feel that democracy
can't exist in the face of serious energy shortages and look
to a socialist government to ameliorate allocation and eth ical considerations .
Neoclassical economic theory offers a more complete
explanation o f the source of value .

Value is derived from

all inputs , including land , labor , capital , techno l ogy ,
energy and expertise ; all of which have intrinsic value and
therefore require remunerati on .

In addition , the pleasu re

consumers derive from the output also figures into the eval uation via demand .

Table 1 summarizes the sources of value

according to the labor, energy and neoclassical theories of
value .
From Table 1, it is apparent th a t energetics does not
account for the overwhelming majority o f factors providing
uti li ty to peop l e .

In addition, some factors cannot be

reduced to energy units (e . g ., tastes) .

It is apparent that

analysis based on an energy theory of value cannot tell us
more about social welfare than neoclas si cal analysis.
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Table 1 . Summa ry of sources of value according
to the labo r ene r gy and neoclassical theories
of value
Determinants of Value
Demand Factors

Supply Factors

Labor theory
of value

None

Labor

Energy theory
of value

None

Energy

Neoclassical
economics

Price of related
income, expecta tions , tastes
transaction,
costs, other

Cost of input,
e . g ., wages,
rent, t r ans action costs ,
technology ,
expectations,
other

Georgescu-Roegen (1979, p . 1046) provided a mathematic
p r oof of these conclusions .
technology matrix X.

He starts with an input - output

The X matrix is multiplied by a column

vector of energy equivalents (b 1 b 2 b 3 • • • b n)

denoted b .

Multiplying X and b yields a vector of energy needs to pro duce each good , e .
1)

Therefore ,

xb = e

rel ates production of goods to total energy budget (e) .

X

Georgescu - Roegen takes the same technology matrix
multiplies it by the price vector for each item p = (p
. pn) to obtain a total dollar budget B.
2)

i

Pz p

3

That is :

xp = B

B is a column vector B = (B
k

1

• +P X )
1 1

and K

n

and S

n

B . . . Bn) where Bi
1 2
represent the price of

(pi
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capital and othe r fact o rs of production.
In the energy model (equation one) the energy budget e
can, given technology x, yield energy costs for every good .
In case two no price determinations are possible because
there are more variables, e . g . , Pk and P n' than equations .
In two, the B values can only be determined when these
values are supplied by markets.

Market prices reflect the

tastes, incomes, preferences and e xpe ctatio ns of consumers
that energetic analysis does not address .
Georgescu - Roegen (1979 , p . 1048) concludes that :
It is now perfectly clear that in absolutely no sit uation is it possible for the energy equivalents to
represent economic evaluations .
Although the matrix
of the price system 2 is the same as that of the
energy equivalents the former cannot be equivalent
to the latter .
The deficiency of energetics as a decision tool is
evident in public works evaluation .
the traditional method used .

Benefit/cost ratios are

The benefit/cost test is a

"potential pareto optimal criterion . "

The true pareto

optimal criterion is that a project makes no one worse off
and at least one person better off .

By this criterion , a

project would be feasible only if those who benefit could
and did compensate the total losses of those who lose .

The

potential pareto benefit/cost test considers a project
worthwhile if compensation to losers could be made whether
or not it is .

Clearly, under a benefit/cost test if the sum

of losses and gains is positive there is an increase in
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social welfare .

Society therefore pursues pareto optimal or

potential pareto optimal solutions in order to increase or
maximize social welfare.

Adopting an energy criterion ,

e . g ., energy efficiency of processes or maximum net energy
to consumers, decreases the likelihood of reaching the
pareto optimal allocation .

For example , net energy account -

ing often does not account for differences in energy quality
or availability .

Therefore, if net energy analys i s were

used to maximize net energy available to consumers, explod ing a hydrogen bomb could appear more beneficial than pro ducing one million bushels of wheat .
Energy Analysis Efficiency and Reality
Energy analysis expands traditional engineering energy
efficiency ratios to include all project inputs and outputs .
Energy efficiency (abbreviated to efficiency in energy
analysis literature) is based on the theoretical maximum
work available from a Carnot engine .

The theoretical Carnot

engine cycle is firmly based in the first law of
thermodynamics .
efficiencies .

However, the law pertains only to energy
Thus , energy efficie ncies must give way to

the wider concept of economic efficiency when project values
are in part the result of mate r ials const rain ts and human
desires .

For example, energy efficiency is only part of the

basis for economic evaluation of steam driven electric tur bines .

The market value of the metals and technologies used
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in producing the turbine must also be considered .

When the

project includes a large percentage of materials or tech nology, e . g ., a dam or electronic computer , energy account i n g is less applicab le because subjective human values play
larger roles in project evaluation .
Therefo re, if energy analys i s is to provide relevant
information, energy analysts must realize that:
1)

Economic efficiency is a b r oader measure than

energy efficiency ;
2)

Regarding energy efficiency as efficient in a

social sense is flirting with an energy theory of value or
the notion that energy is the sole absolute constraint; and
3)

Energy efficiencies may or may not provide informa -

tion relevant to economic evaluations.
Economic Evaluation of the Energy

Numer~ire

Despite Be rr y's and Slesser ' s assurances to the con trary, the use of energy numeraire does not give us the
information needed to allocate resources.
numeraire is not stable.

First, the energy

Technology changes can cause

energy numeraire fluctuations in a relatively short time .
For example , in 1963, the Kilo - calorie to dollar ratio was
21 , 200 ; in 1970, 17,300 and 15 , 800 in 1972 (Gilliland 1975) .
Second , energy is not the sole s ource of value .

There -

fore, the value of the marginal physical product should be
equated for all resources not just energy.

This principle

can be illustrated with the oil shale example .

The
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energetic notion that oil shale is economically feasible
on l y when the net energy from oil shale approximates that of
crude oil is completely false .

If large increases in demand

or OPEC decreases in supply cause price increas es large
enough so that oil shale is p r ofitable , produ cers will not
hesitate to produce oil shale, whether o r not it is a net
energy producer .

Crude oil owners would simply earn rents

on the cheaper crude ·energy sources .

The idea that energy

r esources will be produced unt i l energy content of all
sou rc es are equal is a partial analog of the econo mic para digm :
Marginal Product X
p

Marginal Pro duct Y
p
y

X

This formula accounts for the subjective evaluation (e . g .,
convenience and cleanness) of different energy resources and
their relative costs of production.

When we oppose the

above economic formula with the ene rgy equivalent, marginal
energy product X

=

marginal energy product Y, we see that

energetics numeraire short run stability is brought through
the loss of relevant information.
Changing market evaluations reflect changes in hu man
abilities for whatever reason to gain utility from an object
in a welfare maximizing soc iety; such changes cannot be
ig n ored .

Third, although it may be true that energy

accounting conce ivably cou l d measu re all of the energy flows
that cross an ecosystem's interface, it does not solve the
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problem of evaluating the worth of stich energy quantities to
people or even to p l ants and animals .

Is an acre of wild

hay as valuable as an acre of soybeans just because their
net energies are the same (Bell 1977)?

Are Canadian geese

and whooping cranes , whic h ' are approximately the same size,
of equal value?

The basic problem is to design human wel-

fare values where no subjective market exists .

The use of

an energy numeraire is a step backward in that people do not
value BTU's qua BTU , but f or what each type of energy con tributes to human welfare .
Intergenerational Resource Allocations
The notion that a zero growth steady state is that
optimal path for present and future generations is subject
to much debate .

Koopmans (1974) shows, for example, that

given convex utility functions , even with a zero interest
rate, society will choose to consume nonreplenishable
resources at above minimum subsistence rates .

Many

economists , among them Baumuol (1968) and Huettner (1975)
postulate that resource consumption in the present will
allow us to increase the standard of living in the future
via capital accumulation and technological changes .

Zealous

conservation under these conditions would mean taxing the
present poor to subsidize the future rich.

Other economists

disagree with this rosey assessment , e . g ., Schumpeter (1934)
and Georgescu - Roegen (1979) and Rawls (1971) .

Regardless of
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the outcome of this debate , for the foreseeable future, zero
growth is not an acceptable national political goal of any
western democracy .

Witness, for example, the political

ramifications of recession and depression on United States
presidential elections .
Economists are far more united in their rejection of
the notion that a steady state would produce a zero interest
rate .

The basis for this assessment lies in both the

mater i al and psychological worlds .

The material realities

dictate that capital goods in a steady state wear out .
Therefore , there will always be choice s between consuming
and saving to replac e capital, which capital to replace ,
when to replace it and the length of the pay back period .
On the human level , the concept that passed some point
increased consumption results in diminishing marginal
utility is well established .

This notion leads directly to

the assessment that there i s a positive price that must be
paid for foregoing current as well as future consumption .
The same logic holds for aggregate consumption and pre ferences .

In addition , inasmuch as most biologists theorize

that the lot of any species is ultimate extinction, human
society , if it is risk adve r se , will generally discount an
uncertain future , albeit to a smal l er degree than private
individuals .

However , some question the ethics of discount -

ing the future (Nehe r 1976 and Nash 1975), but do not dis pute the fact that individuals and society do discount the
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future.
Economists have questioned what the correct social rate
of discount is.

The majority writing on the subject

conclude that the optimal social discount rate is less than
the private market rate because of risk incurred by private
investors and/or corporate taxes (Harberger 1968).
Harberger derives perhaps the most accepted social rate of
discount which can conceivably be tested empirically .

In

addition, some economists , notably Harberger, show that the
private individual ' s interest rate differs from the market
rate because of taxes or fixed individual savings .
Dissenting economists , notably Marglin (1963), argue
that private market determined interest rates have no
bearing on the optimal social discount rate.
In summary, although there is not total agreement among
economists as to the proper discount rate , or modeling
techniques, intergenerational resource allocation must be
decided in one manner or another .

Economists have sought

theoretical and empirical evidence of the correct path or
paths to follow.

More work must be done.

However, energy

analysis does not appear capable of yielding significant
information on intergenerational allocation over and above a
market decision because :
1)

Energetics has not developed and cannot support a

model of intergenerational resource allocation , see page 28 .
Therefore, energetics cannot assume, considering current

46
modeling , positive growth and interest rates and current
political realities that their arguments regarding zero
growth and zero interest rates are to be regarded as
anything more than normative statements .
From the preceding discussion, it is evident that :
1)

Energy is probably not the only limiting factor;

2)

Energy is not the ultimate source of all value ; and

3)

Energy numeraires are not superior to dollars when

evaluating human desires and costs ; and
4)

Energetics models of the economy are non - existent

and the theoretical foundations for them are deeply flawed .
Th~refore,

energetics, as far as it embraces an energy

theory of value, is of no practical modeling significance in
resource allocation.
We now turn our attention to energy and economic
analysis and their comparisons of flat water recr eation at
selected Utah reservoirs .
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CHAPTER V
SURVEY TECHNIQUES
To compare economic and energy analysis results, a
survey was undertaken to obtain data on recreational energy
use, travel distance and time spent on four selected Utah
reservoirs .
The same questionnaire was employed to gather data for
both the eco nomic and energy ana l yses .
Questionnaire Design
The basic data regarding recreationists on Willard Bay,
East Canyon , Rockport and Hyrum reservoirs was provided
using the questionnaire found in Appendix A.

Information

concerning the parties ' origin, size and length of stay,
type of vehicle(s) , type of boat , size of boat motor(s) and
the percent of time spent in various activities was
gathered .

Previous questionnaires with similar objectives

were used as sources for the questionnaire construction .
Interviews
Questionnaires were administered in two ways .

The

majority were gathered through personal interviews with
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recreators as they visited each site.

Approximately 20% of

the questionnaires were gathered by Utah Department of Parks
and Recreation (UPR) personnel.

The latter method meant

that only brief instructions were given to respondents .
Sampling Procedure
The target population consisted of those who recreate
on the four selected Utah reservoirs .

An effort was made to

obtain a random sample of recreators from July through
August on each site.

However , since only one interviewer

was employed, a completely random sample was not obtained
for each reservoir.

Effort was allocated with respect to

reservoir size with Willard Bay receiving the most and Hyrum
the least time .
Data Biases
Several factors affect the possible bias of the data .
First , because questionnaires were taken only from July
through August, no measurement of early (May - June)
recreators was obtained .

Second , the quality of the data

differed because Rockport and East Canyon data were gathered
to a great degree by UPR rangers who generally gave less
personal attention to the project than did the interviewer .
As a result, a percentage of the questionnaires from these
sites were not filled out completely and were not useable.
Third, only 20 observations were made at Hyrum, making the
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results statistically unrep.resentative .

The low number of

observations was due to lesser number of survey days and
unwillingness of recreators to fill out a questionnaire or
be interviewed .

Fourth, the assumption that the sample was

an unbiased sample of the population could not be made
because the samples were not gathered on random days or
times .
inches.

Finally, the size of some moto rs was

gi~en

in cubic

This required a conversion to horse power for

comparability .

This conversion may inject some bias into

the on - site energy consumption figures .

It is not known in

which direction or to what extent these problems bias the
results .
Steps Taken to Mitigate Bias
The percentages of recreators from different origins
was computed from the samples.

These were compared to the

estimates made by UPR personnel .

The two estimates were

closely correlated , differing by no more than 3% for any
origin and site except Hyrum .

In that case, the sample

listed Salt Lake City as the origin for 82% of the
recreators.

This compared to the UPR estimate of 10% from

Salt Lake City and 66% from Cache County .

Because so few

observations were made at the Hy rum site , UPR personnel
estimates were used in the analysis which follows .

50
Flaws in the Data
After surveying was c omp leted , it was n ote d that t h e
length of stay question had not been understood and/or
filled in by many respondents.

This made the quality of

recreation variable inaccurate and negated any attempts at
quantifying results .

What foll o ws is an example of

techniques used by energy analysts and economists using the
flawed data .
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CHAPTER VI
THE ENERGY MODEL FOR FLAT WATER RECREATION
The energy model used in this study to analyze energy
costs of recreation on Willard Bay, Rockport, East Canyon
and Hyrum reservoirs is the one developed by Clair Batty ,
David Bell and Thomas Stoddard (Stodda r d 1980).

Recreation

energy costs were broken down into two categories:

travel

energy expenditures (E1) and on - site energy expenditures
(E2).

This study uses gasoline consumption as a surrogate for
total travel energy expenditures for two reasons :
1)

The calculations were made easier ; and

2)

The other energy costs , car wear and tear and oil ,

are small compared to gas consumed by cars in sample .
Estimates of gasoline use for travel to each re servoir
was found using the following equations :
1)

xl (mpgl) + . . xn (mpg n) = avg. mpg
number of cars in sample

when X n = # of car type n in sample and mpg n
avg . mpg of n type car ;
2)

0 1(m 1)+0 2 (m 2) ... +0 n (m

0

)

= miles

traveled to site by sample recreationists
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when On is origin n and mn is miles from origin n to site ;

3)

# of recrea tion sam led on site
of recr eationists visiting in given year

fraction .
4)

Thus;

miles traveled to site by
sample recr eationists
avg . mpg of cars in sample

X

fraction

gallons spent traveling to site
On Site Energy Expenditures (E2)
E2 was assumed to consist o f gas used to power motor
boats .

This assumpti on was made because :

1)

Calcu lati ons were much simpler; and

2)

Power boating is by far the largest energy consumer

in flat water recr eation .
The following equation was used by Tom Stoddard (1980)
to find estimates of on site energy consumption .
1)

Summation of horse power
in boat surveyed
# boats surveyed

=

2)

# of boaters surveyed
in sample
# of boaters in year

=

Average horse
power in boats
su r veyed
fraction

It was then assumed that boaters staying less than twelve
hours spend 9/10 of their time boating and boaters staying
longer than twelve hours spend 1 / 4 of their time boating .
Therefore :

3) 1 /4(# of long stay boats)(# of long stay hours)
+ (9/1 0) (# shorter stay boats ) (# of short stay hours) x
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X avg boat h.p . x
fraction

gallons
boat hour

gallons of gasoline used annually .

Using the data gathered from on site questioning, E1 and E2
were found for each reservoir .

The energy consumption fig -

ures per visit ranked highest to lowest are in Table 2 .
Table 2 .
Sample recreational gas consumption at
four Utah reservoirs
1)

East Canyon

40 . 79 gallons/visit

2)

Rockport

33 . 99 gallons/visit

3)

Hyrum

28 . 81

4)

Willard

27 . 51 gallons/visit

gallons/visit

Usefulness of Energy Expenditure Method
As was shown previously , use of energy analysis to
evaluate projects other than those requiring energy effi ciency in the thermodynamic sense contributes no normative
information because it fails to reflect the multiple
objectiv es of human welfare and relative resourc e con straints .

However, since energy effici encies are

analyzed by totaling energy costs and miles traveled is a
proxy p rice for willingness to pay for recrea tion, the util ity of recreators is implicitly represented by this ranking.
For exa mple, because people expend more energy and thus
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money at East Canyon than at Willard Bay, a case might be
made that they enjoy it more; otherwise , they would spend
less and go to Willard Bay.

Energy expenditures in gallons

of gasoline (Q) is directly related to the economic measure
gross expenditures, i . e . , price times quantity of gasoline
used (PQ) .

The usefulness of the energy expenditures and

g ros s expenditure methods will be discussed after the empir ical gross

expendit~re

example is presented in the economic

model chapter .
Energetics and the Energy Expenditure Rankings
The

~nergy

theory of value implies that energy should

be conserved whenever possible .

For this reason, energetic

ranking of the reservoirs might list the smallest energy
consumer per visit first,

the largest last, that is:

Table 3 . Sample energetic ranking of four Utah
reservoirs

1)

Willard

27 . 51 gallons/visit

2)

Hyrum

28 . 81 gallons/visit

3)

Rockport

33 . 99 gallons/visit

4)

East Canyon

40.79 gallons/visit

Thus, energetic rankings might contradict economic
rankings that purport to measure consumer welfare.

This

ranking will be compared with the economic counterpart after
these estim ates have been developed .
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CHAPTER VII
THE ECONOMIC MODEL OF FLAT WATER RECREATION
It is generally accepted that flat water recreation has
value .

The problem . is that public agencies often suppl y the

facilities for flat water recreation .

As a result, unlike

most goods, this type of r ec reati on is not sold in markets
that assign prices .

Some have argued that flat water recre -

ation is p ric eless .

Unt i l recently , most planners have

agreed with this argument and thus refused to measure its
value .

However , if it is accepted that whatever exists can

be measured , the value of flat water recreati on must have
some definable quantity.

The task , then , is to develop a

theoretical framework for economic evaluation of flat water
recreation and the associated empirical procedures .
Economic Demand
The basic demand principle is that the quantity
demanded by consumers varies inversely with the price .
low price , a large quantity will be demanded .

At a

At a high

price , a relatively small quantity will be demanded .

At a

low price , a relatively large quantity will be co nsumed.
Figure 6 is a typical linear demand cu r ve for good X.
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Price of
good X
Demand curve
Quantity demanded of
good X
Figure 6 .

Typica l demand curve

Economic values measure how much people are willing to
give up to enjoy a good or service .

The concept is the same

for marketed a s well as non - marketed goods , e . g ., flat water
recreation .

Consumers of any economic good receive satis -

faction equal to o r greater than the price they are willing
to incur.

Goods sold in markets cost consumers the market

price plus the time and effort needed to make the trans action .

These outlays regulate the amount of the good con -

sumed .

Likewise , the monetary and time , e . g ., travel ; costs

of a recreational activity will regulate how much recreation
is consumed .

In order to construct a flat water de mand

estimate , an app r opriate money and time cost price must be
determined .

If these costs can be determined , then a

statistical demand estimate can be made that is comparable
to market priced goods .
There are two cost related decisions that a recreator
must make .

First , in the long run he must decide whether to
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buy recreational equipment of a fixed nature, e . g., jeeps,
tents and boats that commit him to a specific type of recreation .

These costs, once incurred , do not affect the deci -

sion to recreate on any given day or at any given place.
The second decision that a recreator makes is a short run
decision.

He must decide when and where to recreate .

Important considerations in this case include time , travel
and any on site costs that are incurred while recreating .
These costs are valuable and affect the decision whether or
not to participate in a particular recreational activity.
These costs are thus the pertinent costs for surrogate pric ing of non-marketed goods in the short run.
The economic model used in this study to assign values
to recreation activities on the Utah reservoirs :

Willard

Bay , Hyrum, Rockport and East Canyon; is the travel cost
model of Hotelling and Clawson .

The simple model reviewed

by Martin and Gum (1974) is employed to obtain demand
curves.

Consumed surplus is then calculated from the demand

curves.

The model makes three key assumptions (King and

Davis, 1978, p . 28):
1)

Entry Fees:

It is assumed that an individual would

react to an increase in entry fees in the same manner as to
an increase in travel costs ;
2)

Specification :

The assumption is made that all

relevant and statistically significant variables which
affect trip - making behavior are properly specified in the

58
travel cost model.

Unde r this assumption , unbiased esti -

mates of the slope of the site demand curve may be found ;
3)

Capacity Constraints :

It is assumed that observed

data points used to estimate the original model are true
demand points.

That is, there is no unobserved demand that

goes unsatisfied .
If for any given reservoir these assumptions are not
true, then the re sults must be qual ified.

It will be

assumed that deviations fr om the above conditions occur
equally on all sites .

Therefore , since only a ranking is

desired deviations need not be specified .
The first step in the development of the model is to
construct a demand function for the total recreational expe rience on a given reservoir .

This is done by utilizing

transportation cost as a surrogate for the true price of
recr eatio n .

Freeman (19 79) and Willig ( 197 6) p rovide justi -

fication for using a single cost , e . g ., transportation
costs; as a surrogate for true price of a good .

The

statistical demand cu rve is then one in which (transporta tion) costs are mapped against recreation measured in tr~ps
to site as in Ffgure 7 .
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Transportation
costs

Visits to site per 1000 population
Figure 7.
Response curve for the recreational
experience on a reservoir
The second step is to derive a statistical demand curve
for the reservoir site itself from the response curve for
the recreational experience.

This is made possible by

assuming that the recreators would react to changes in costs
at the site , e . g ., entrance fees ; in the same manner they
would react to changes in the costs of the recreation expe rience as a whole .

The demand curve for the reservoir site

is derived by relating posited added costs , e . g ., higher
entrance fees ; to the number of visits that would occur at
each higher pr ice .

The resulting demand curve is in terms

of added costs and total visits to the site ; that would
occur at prices higher than the observed price , (see Figure
8) .
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Added
dollar
costs

Total visits rec r eational
Figure 8 .

Demand c u rve for reservoi r

The specific procedures of these steps are outlined in
the empirical example which follows .
Emp irical Exam pl e
The East Can yon rec r eational demand cu rv e is de r ived as
an example .

The costs of t r avel from each or i gin to East

Canyon as assumed to be the same f o r eve r y visit from a
given origin .

The number of visits is put on a basis of per

1 , 000 population from the origin ; see Table 4 .
Table 4 . Sampl e demand for total rec r e a tional
experience : East Canyon reservoi r

Origin

Morgan
SLC
Ogden
Provo

Cost

$2 . 00
$4 . 80
$7 . 00
$14 . 40

Total visits to site :

Visits
f r om
o r igin
82

6 , 566
1 '313

246

8,207

Vis i ts/

1 ' 000

popul a tion
15 . 49
9 . 38
9 .1 2
1 . 24
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By plotting cost (column 1) against visits / 1, 000 population
(col umn 4), a statist ical demand curve for the total recrea tional experience is determined .

This estimated curve is

shown in Figure 9.

Cost
per
trip

Visits/1 , 000 population
Figure 9 . Statistical demand curve for recreational
experience East Canyon reservoir
Next , an equation is found that gives the best fit to
the data in Table 4 .

Exponential , logarithmic and power

functions were all tried .

The power function y

=

AXB where

A = 50 . 48; B = 1 . 2 and R 2 = - . 89 fit the data best according
to the R2 statistic .

The demand equation visits

=

50 . 48

(travel cost) 1. 2 is then used to derive a demand curve for
recreation on the reservoir in the following manner .

The

total projected number of visits is calculated at each
posited increase in travel costs .

(The fitted power func -

tion demand curve is used for this instead of Table 4
because the t r avel cost increases are in $1 . 00 increments ,
making estimates of visits between the data points in Table
4 necessary . )
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For example, by adding increments of $1.00 to the
travel costs of the recreators from each origin, the corre spending projected number of visits can be determined by
using the equation, V = 50 . 48 P -

1 2
· Vis in visits per 1 , 000

residents of the respondents origins .

Therefore, in order

to obtain total trips taken at each extra cost, the visits
per 1,000 population must be multiplied by the number of
thousand residents of each origin .

The number of trips

taken per each additional dollar cost is the sum of total
visits projected from each origin at a given increase in
cost.

For example, Table 5 shows that at zero additional

cost, a total of 6,557 trips ~o East Canyon are projected,
and 116 from the Morgan area; 5,340 from the Salt Lake City
area ; 697 from· Ogden and 404 from the Provo area . )

From

columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 , a statistical recreational
demand curve for a reservoir can be constructed (see Figure
1 0) .

The same curve fitting procedures were used and the
best fit equation is the power function y ~ AX
2
9948 . 88 B = - 0 . 8 R = -. 97 .

8

where A =
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Travel
cost

189

5,290
Numbe r of v isits

Figure 10 .
Recreational demand for East Canyon
reservoir , Utah
Consumer Su rplus
Consumer surplus is the most accepted measure of r ecre ational values (Schuster and Jones 1982 )_.

It measures the

surplus satisfa cti on that a consume r receives from a commod ity above the price he had to pay for it.

The central i dea

is that consumers have a price they are willing to pay
rather than do without the item .

If a consumer pays less

than he would be willing t o , he has incurred a surplus.

For

example , if the price of recreation in Figure 4 were z e r o ,
189 peop le would still be willing to pay $1 00 for the oppor tunity to recreate there.

Hence, at the zero price, each of

these 189 would be receiving a consumer surplus of $1 , 000 .
If th e price is zer o for all consumers, then the total

Table 5 .

Sample projected visits from cities to four Utah reservoirs
Morgan
Pop . 5 , 300

Salt Lake City
Pop. 700 , 000

Ogden
Pop . 144 , 000

Provo
Pop . 199 , 000

Extra Total Visits/ Total Visits/ Tota l
Visits/ Total Visits/ Total
Cost Visits 1 , 000 Visits 1 , 000 Visits 1 , 000 Visits 1 , 000 Visits

$0

6 , 557

21. 89

116

7 . 63

5 , 340

4 . 84

697

2 . 03

404

$1

5 , 290

13 . 40

71

.6 . 07

4 , 252

4 . 13

534

1. 87

373

$2

4 , 42 1

9 . 43

50

5. 01

3 ' 510

3 . 58

51 5

1 . 74

346

$3

3 , 790

7 . 36

39

4 . 25

2 , 975

3 . 15

454

1. 62

322

$4

3 , 310

5 . 85

31

3 . 68

2 , 573

2 . 81

405

1 . 51

301

$5

2 , 932

4 . 91

26

3 . 23

2 , 260

2 . 53

364

1.42

282

$6

2 , 629

4 . 15

22

2 . 87

2 , 010

2 . 30

331

1.34

266
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surplus of all consu mers is measured by the area under th e
demand curve .

In the case of East Canyon, we can integrate
the fitted power functi on V = 19948.88 (T . C. ) - · 8 from 1 to

100 .

One and 100 are used instead of zero and infinity

becaus e both va l ues represent 1 inflection point as the
curve asymptot icall y approaches the axi s .

Therefore, esti -

mated consumer surpl us for East Canyon is:
V

=

T . C. · 2

19948 . 88

Statistical

de~ a nd

}1~0

= $7 5 '2 00

curves ana consumer surpl us estimates

were de rived for Willa rd Bay , Rockport an d Hyrum in a simi lar manne r.

Power func t ion (y

=

AXB) yielded best R 2 fit

for al l reservoirs.
Cons ume r sur pl uses pe r visit ranked from highest to
lowest are as follows:
Table 6. Sample consumer surpluses for four Utah
reservoirs
1)

East Canyon

$9 .1 4/per visit

2)

Rockport

$8 . 35/per visit

3)

Hyrum

$6 .93 /per visit

4)

Hillard

$6 . 35/per visit

This ranking is the same as that derived previously with
energy accounting techniques.
probable energetic ran king .

It is the opposite of the
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Usefulness of Consumer Surplus
A caveat about the use of consumer surplus estimates is
required.

First, consumer surplus is not comparable to mar-

ket price.

If marketed and non - marketed goods are compared

consumer surpluses should be found for both types of goods
(Dyer and Hof 1979).

Exceptions to this rule may occur when

a single factor greatly influences consumption of a nonmarketed good which represents a large segment of the total
supply, e.g. , as is the case of travel costs to a large res ervoir used for recreation (Binkley 1980).
The Gross Expenditure Method
The gross expenditure method sums the total cost to
recreators participating in an activity .

Gross expenditures

on East Canyon are calculated as an example.
The travel costs for a round tr ip are estimated from
each origin by assuming that all recreators from that origin
face the same travel expenses .

The visits by origin are

multiplied by an average cost for a round trip from that
origin (Table 7).
Next, on site expenditures (E 2 ) are estimated.

Gaso -

line for boating is, in this example, considered the single
on - site cost .

Gasoline consumption on the four reservoirs

is estimated in the energetic model chapter .

The figure for

East Canyon is 241 , 170 gallons, assuming a cost of $1.00 per
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gallon, the tota l

1979 gross expenditure for East Canyon

rese r voir recreation was $329 , 998 . 40 o r $40 . 21 per visit.
Table 7 . Sample travel costs for East Canyon
reservoir
Total
travel
cost

Or igin

Visits
from
origin

Tr a vel cost

$ 4 . 00

82

9 . 60

6,566

63 , 033 . 60

Ogden

14 . 00

1 '313

18 , 382.00

Provo

28.80

246

7 , 084 . 80

Morgan
Salt Lake

$

Total travel c bst :

328 . 00

$88 , 828 . 40

Gross expenditures for the other reservoirs were esti mated in the same manner.

The 1979 gross expenditures per

visit on the four reservoirs, ranked first to last , were:
Table 8 . Gross expenditure rankings of Utah
reservoirs
1)

Rockport

$41. 58 per visit

2)

East Canyon

$ 4 0 . 21 pe r visit

3)

Hy r um

$3 6. 02 p e r visit

4)

l~illard

$30 . 24 per visit

These rankings are nearly the same as those for expenditure
me t hod and consumer surplus , except Rockport and East Canyon
a re reversed .

However, if we assume a 10% error facto r ,
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there is no statistically significant difference between the
Rockport and East Canyon estimates.

The rankings are the

inverse of the probable energetic ordering.
The Usefulness of the Gross Expenditure Method
The concept underlying the use of gross expenditures as
a measure of value is that people receive values
corrresponding to their recreational expenditures.
wise, they would not make them.

Other -

However, if recreation were

abolished, most of the recreators' money would simply be
spent on other goods and services .

Economists contend that

losses in satisfaction from a shift away from recreational
goods would not equal gross expenditures .

Thus, gross rec -

reational expenditures are not comparable with net economic
benefits that would be estimated for the alternative uses of
the resources .

The energy expenditure method has the same

deficiencies as gross expenditures because gross expendi tures are a function of energy expenditures.
Comparison of Energy Accounting, Consumer Surplus,
And Gross Expenditure Empirical Results
The three methods used to find recreation costs, energy
expenditures, consumer surplus and gross expenditures all
yield the same rankings.

Thi s is to be expec ted in the case

of energy expenditures and gross expenditures .

Both use

analogous procedures, i.e . , a physical quantity (Q) as its

69
monBtary value (PQ) and the same data .

Consumer surplus

(CS) rankings should be the same as those of gross expendi tures since E

=

cost and CS

f(TC) assuming TC and f(TC) are positive and

TC where E

=

expenditure and TC

=

travel

monatonic transformations.
Thus, the three measures, energy expenditures, con sumer surplus and gross expenditures, should theoretically
yield the same rankings.

The energetic ranking should not

be the same because the goal of energetics is to conserve
energy or its corollary maximum output per energy unit
expended .

The explicit goal of economic welfare measures

such as consumer surplus is to maximize human welfare .
Human welfare often is a function of energy consumption .
The goals of economic analysis and energetics may
then be opposites and opposite rankings may result .
Because the energy expenditure and gross expenditure
methods have little theoretical basis supporting policy
decisions, these methods are not recommended .

The energetic

rankings of energy expenditure utilizes the energy theory of
value which is too narrow .

Consumer surplus estimates with

the appropriate caveats are recommended.
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CHAPTER VIII
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Traditional economics may not deal adequately with some
problems of resourc~ allocation .

Energy analysis has been

suggested as a supplement or replacement for economics in
resource problem areas.

However, energetic methods are not

superior to economics because:
1)

The energy theory of value is too narrow;

2)

Other materials also appear to be absolute

constraints;
3)
well with
4)

Energetics does not lead to models that correlate
re~lity ;

Energetics does not lead to definitive conclusions

on intergenerational resource allocation; and
5)

The energy numeraire is too narrow to address the

wide range of human desires .
The sample empirical results show that for the boating
recreation study gross expenditures (the summation of PiQi)
energy accounting methods (the summation of Qi) and consumer
surplus (the integration of total costs) yielded the same
project rankings with respect to recreation outlays.
was the expected result.

Consumer surplus is the most

This
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widely accepted method for evaluating willingness to pay for
non-marketed goods .

Rankings based on minimizing energy

costs of recreation are the reverse of consumer surplus.
Thus, if energetics were used as a policy tool, reservoirs
with the highest consumer surplus (or utility) would be the
least likely to receive funding and vice versa.

The

preferences revealed by consumer behavior are not consistent
with minimizing energy costs and the associated energy
theory of value .
Energy accounting can add significantly to methods of
efficient resource allocation if it is used to point out
areas of potential increases in energy e·fficiency.

Energy

accounting per se has little normative significance .
The study's empirical results could easily be improved
by:
1)

Using full individual data as outlined by Martin

and Gum ( 1 97 4) ;
2)

Reducing inherent biases in demand estimation as

outlined by Beardsley (1971);

J)

Improving the sample ; and

4)

Improving the data gathering techniques .

However, little gain would be expected by improvement
of the empirical results since the question of the efficacy
of energetics is based upon theoretical grounds .
A critical re-evaluation of the theoretical
underpinnings of this paper would be warranted if
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significant data revealed that individuals regarded energy
availab ility (as stocks) as a direct argument in their
utility function, rather than an input to the consumption
process . ·
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~UTAH

STATE DIVISION OF PAR KS AND RECREATION AND ~[E
UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY: USER SURVEY
**********************************************************
Name:
Address:
Phone:
Boat #:
Type of Vehicle (circle): Car (small, intermediate, full),
Pickup, Van, 4-Wheel Drive, Motor Home
Camping Equipment (circle): Tent, Camper, Trailer, Other
Type & Size of Boat and Motors:
inboard, inboard/outboard, jet, sail, paddle
size of boat:
size of motors :
No. in party: ____ Time spent on site:
Percent of time spent:
fishing,
skiing,
boating
=camping,= ORV,
other
\1ere other sites visited on this trip? Yes, No. If so, where

~

What could we do to make your stay more enjoyable? (use back)

